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concern to this article, however, is the blurring between the private and nonprofit
sectors. The cross-pollination is so widespread that a call stands to amend the
existing model with an “emerging fourth sector.”
The social entrepreneurs attempting to bridge the gap between sectors face
limitations from the outset of their venture; legislators did not design traditional
legal entities for a “double bottom line” that includes social impact as well as
profit. Because the demand exists, and because a lethargic legislative response
will not hinder the entrepreneurial spirit, these pioneers have attempted to form
hybrids under existing legal frameworks. Complexity and cost, however,
significantly deter this avenue of social enterprise. Consequently, state legislatures
have begun to address the need for legitimate hybrid alternatives.
The two business forms attracting the most legal, legislative, and media
attention are the Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) and the Benefit
Corporation (B Corporation). The L3C, a Limited Liability Company (LLC)
hybrid, exploits the LLC’s organizational flexibility, while attracting capital for the
actual enterprise through Program Related Investments. The B Corporation is a
corporation hybrid that permits a company’s board and management to contract
around the rule of profit-maximization. While both frameworks have merit, they
are at once competing for the same share of public-consciousness and legislative
attention. For that reason, I will be contrasting the two against the backdrop of the
WorldOne case.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a rare experience for a young attorney to address a substantive legal
issue on the cutting edge of the law. Specifically, I am referring to the boundaries
of the law’s relationship to society—the place where legislation fails to
accommodate societal progress. My experience in the George Washington
University’s Small Business and Community Economic Development Clinic
brought me to such an edge. Our work with WorldOne 1 demonstrates that unique
and socially beneficial entrepreneurial ideas require legislators to address a void
with an organizational framework for private/nonprofit hybrid organizations.
The traditional three-sector ownership model of society grows outmoded. 2
The prevalence of quasi-governmental agencies, public-private partnerships, and
government bailouts blurs the line between the public and private sectors. 3 Of
concern to this article, however, is the blurring between the private and nonprofit

1
The name of the company—along with discernable factual information—has been changed in
order to protect client confidentiality. I have retained the essential elements of the case to demonstrate
the hypothetical benefits to this start-up in organizing under different statutes designed for social
enterprise.
2
The three standard sectors in the ownership model—Private Enterprise, Government, and Nonprofit—are turning into six sectors as hybrid organizations that straddle the line between the classic
model gain influence. That is not to argue that hybrids have overtaken the classic sectors, only that the
rules that divide them are no longer adequate. See Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business:
Does Social Enterprise Need a New Legal Approach?, 2 (Jan., 2007), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/
sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/New_Legal_Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf.
3
Id.
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sectors. The cross-pollination is so widespread that a call stands to amend the
existing model with an “emerging fourth sector.” 4
The social entrepreneurs attempting to bridge the gap between sectors face
limitations from the outset of their venture; legislators did not design traditional
legal entities for a “double-bottom-line” that includes social impact as well as
profit. 5 Because the demand exists, and because a lethargic legislative response
will not hinder the entrepreneurial spirit, these pioneers have attempted to form
hybrids under existing legal frameworks. 6 Complexity and cost, however,
Consequently, state
significantly deter this avenue of social enterprise. 7
legislatures have begun to address the need for legitimate hybrid alternatives.
The two business forms attracting the most legal, legislative, and media
attention are the Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) and the Benefit
Corporation (B Corporation). The L3C, a Limited Liability Company (LLC)
hybrid, exploits the LLC’s organizational flexibility, while attracting capital for the
The B
actual enterprise through Program Related Investments (PRIs). 8
Corporation is a corporation hybrid that permits a company’s board and
management to contract around the rule of profit-maximization. 9 While both
frameworks have merit, they are at once competing for the same share of publicconsciousness and legislative attention. For that reason, I will be contrasting the
two against the backdrop of the WorldOne case.
This article follows the development of WorldOne as a business entity in the
emerging fourth sector. Part II will elucidate the background and development of
social enterprise and WorldOne. I will describe the history of social enterprise and
how a similar legislative gap was addressed in the United Kingdom, the current
extrapolations used to accomplish social enterprise in the United States and the
emerging need for business designations that address such dual-purpose entities,
and the route ultimately chosen by WorldOne in a jurisdiction devoid of any
hybrid legislation. Part III will then detail the history and current legal status of
the L3C alongside the theoretical advantages and disadvantages WorldOne would
have met had the L3C business form been available. Finally, Part IV will address
the L3C’s primary competitor for legislative and branding attention, the B
Corporation. I will also chronicle the development of the B Corporation alongside
its theoretical merits to WorldOne.
II. BACKGROUND
As of March 2011, the United Kingdom had 4,905 hybrid organizations
4
Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV.
337, 341 (2009). The relative merits of “emerging sector” qualification between private/non-profit
hybrids and public/private hybrids is beyond the scope of this article.
5
Id. at 339.
6
Id. at 364.
7
Id. (also noting social entrepreneurs complaints that potential sources of investment capital are
inaccessible due to the complexity).
8
Id. at 373–75.
9
Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward for the
Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 357 (2007).
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properly registered and in good standing with the central government agency in
charge of administering the U.K.’s hybrid statute. 10 In contrast, the United States,
which has no federal statute or centralized hybrid administration, claims only 540
L3Cs 11 and 370 certified B corporations. 12 Additionally, because hybrids created
under existing laws are registered as standard corporations or non-profits, it is
impossible to quantify the number of organizations with hybrid goals but no
organizing statute. However, the combination of those entrepreneurs that have
developed the idea by makeshift means since its inception, and those that have
only recently realized the potential in the double bottom line concept, are now
enough to press for change.
A . Early Social Entrepreneurship
The idea of social enterprise first emerged in the early 1960s when lawyerturned-businessman Bill Drayton began to apply “pragmatic and results-oriented
methods” to social change. 13 For decades, however, it merely simmered in the
business and legal subconscious, failing to attract the attention of legislators. In
2006, the advent of Google.org brought the idea of social entrepreneurship a great
deal of media attention. 14 Google’s unique hybrid administration of its
philanthropic arm also spurred the idea of an emerging fourth sector in the United
States and prompted the writing of multiple legal articles addressing the issue. 15
Proposals for defining and accommodating this new sector began to emerge. 16
As the concept grew without legislative attention for more than four decades,
the definition of social enterprise in the United States expanded unchecked. 17
Accordingly, “[o]ne of the major obstacles to the discussion and study of the topic
is the lack of a clear and concise definition.” 18 Conservative or exclusionary
classifications of social entrepreneurship vary wildly from publication to
publication; a thorough attempt to analyze the idea’s development and categorize
its use in different fields spans hundreds of pages. 19

10
Community Interest Companies, Annual Report 2010-2011, BIS (Sept., 2011),
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/cicregulator/docs/annual-reports/11-p117-community-interestcompanies-annual-report-2010-2011.
11
Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com
/l3c_tally.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
12
B Lab, If Not Now When? The Case for B Corp, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (2011),
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/B%20Corp_2011-Annual-Report.pdf.
13
Caroline Hsu, Entrepreneur For Social Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051031/31drayton.htm.
14
Kelley, supra note 4, at 345.
15
See, e.g., Id.; Gottesman, supra note 9, at 345.
16
Kelley, supra note 4.
17
Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 292 (2010) (exploring the difference between an American definition of
social enterprise and the European definition, which has evolved to focus on structural unemplorment).
18
Id.
19
See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2008); see also Doeringer,
supra note 17, at n.20 (noting that the United Kingdom, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland have
legislated an “official” definition of social enterprise).
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However, a precise and narrow definition of social enterprise is not requisite
to addressing the double-bottom line movement. The problem and solution are
easily articulable:
Nonprofits are often constrained by a lack of capital. For-profits are often
constrained by legal duties to maximize profit and not social outcomes. Hybrid
organizations would address both of these constraints by allowing mission-driven
nonprofits to access capital more readily and by allowing for-profits to commit
themselves to achieving social goals. 20

Recognition of this gap in corporate law is not unprecedented. Indeed, the United
Kingdom identified and addressed this identical issue in 2004. 21
The path to legislation for social enterprise in the United Kingdom began in
October 2001. 22 The Social Enterprise Unit (SEU), created by the government
under the purview of the Department of Trade and Industry, was tasked with
“creat[ing] a dynamic and sustainable social enterprise sector as part of an
inclusive and growing economy.” 23 The newly created unit wasted little time. In
less than three years, the SEU recognized the growth in—and barriers facing—the
new sector, proposed the creation of a business entity to accommodate social
enterprise, and saw its legislation adopted by Parliament. 24 The fruit of that labor
is the Community Interest Company (CIC). 25
The SEU carefully created and then reinforced the CIC to promote the
growth of an entirely new economic sector in the United Kingdom:
The CIC is similar to a limited company, but has restrictions guaranteeing that the
company will serve a social interest. A CIC may be a company limited by
guarantee, where all profits are reinvested in the enterprise, or a company limited
by shares, where the company can raise equity and issue limited dividends to its
shareholders. 26

The CIC thoroughly addresses the legislative gap because the statute permits social
goals within a for-profit and easier capital access for the income driven
nonprofit. 27 Further, the United Kingdom government supported its new creation
with programs designed to generate public faith in social enterprise: (1) “the
government created the CIC Regulator to register and monitor compliance with
CIC regulations,” 28 (2) “each CIC must pass the ‘Community Benefit Test,’ and

20

Gottesman, supra note 9, at 346.
See Doeringer, supra note 17, at 311.
22
KMU Forschung Austria, Study on Practices and Policies in the Social Enterprise Sector in
Europe, 43 (June, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.
cfm?doc_id=3408.
23
Id.
24
See CABINET OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, PRIVATE ACTION, PUBLIC BENEFIT: A
REVIEW OF CHARITIES AND THE WIDER NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR (Sept., 2002), available
at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/strat%20data.pdf.
25
Id.
26
See Doeringer, supra note 17, at 312.
27
See id.
28
Id. at 312–13 (“The CIC Regulator’s role is only to be that of a ‘light-touch regulator’ that
21
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annually submit a public report confirming that the Test is being met,” 29 and (3)
“[t]o ensure that money invested in a CIC reaches the community if the CIC is
dissolved, there is an ‘asset-lock’” which—after the dissolution of a CIC—
transfers remaining assets to other charitable organizations. 30 The SEU anticipated
the necessity of these features for growth in social enterprise; Parliament carried
them out uncompromisingly. 31
National control of business regulatory legislation by the British Parliament
was extremely important to the speed with which social enterprise developed in the
United Kingdom. 32 Conversely, because the United States government delegates
choice of business entity issues to the states, a social entrepreneur in a state
without legislation designed to accommodate hybrid organizations faces limited
and un-accommodating alternatives.
B. American Reaction to Entrenched Principles of Business Entity
The early American reaction to the increased popularity of social enterprise
stands in stark contrast to the prevailing British system. Impatient social
entrepreneurs in the United States seeking the double-bottom line have begun to
employ two vehicles for operating hybrid social enterprise under the framework of
standard corporate forms: the “multiple-entity” enterprise and the “not-for-loss”
enterprise. 33
1. The Multiple-Entity Approach
The multiple-entity social enterprise employs a complex structure to ford the
river of complications that flow against a makeshift hybrid:
With this approach, the social entrepreneur and her lawyers establish a for-profit
entity to carry out the revenue-generating aspects of the mission and a related
nonprofit tax-exempt organization to house the social benefit activities. With
sophisticated legal and accounting advice, the nonprofit entity can preserve its
exempt status and attract support from private foundations, governments, and
charitable donors, while simultaneously receiving tax-advantaged cross
subsidization from the related for-profit. At the same time, the for-profit entity can
seek access to venture capital, bank financing, and other investors accustomed to
operating in the open market. The main disadvantage to such multiple-entity
strategies is that they are expensive to create and administratively burdensome to

monitors but does not engage in proactive scrutiny of CICs. However, if the Regulator discovers a
major problem, he or she has the authority to appoint or remove directors and managers and also take
steps to protect the CIC’s property.”).
29
Id. at 313 (“The basic test is whether a ‘reasonable person might consider that [the CIC’s]
activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community.’ This test is generally not satisfied if
the CIC aims to benefit a small number of people or if it intends to support a particular political
party.”).
30
Id.
31
See CABINET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 52–53.
32
See KMU Forschung Austria, supra note 22, at 43 (“[A]s a central government policy initiative,
the SEU acts as a focal point and coordinator for policy making affecting social enterprise, as well as
promoting and championing social enterprise.”).
33
Kelley, supra note 4, at 364.
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maintain. 34

This multi-tiered approach is similar to the one employed by Google.org, which is
understandable given its initial capitalization of $1 billion. 35
2. The Not-For-Loss Approach
In plainer contrast, a not-for-loss social enterprise is operated by a
corporation that is formed under state nonprofit law but does not file for federal
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 36 It aims to
achieve the same goals as the multiple entity approach through a significantly less
complicated business structure:
Once formed, the organization pursues its multiple-bottom-line mission and, for
corporate income tax purposes, simply treats its money-losing social benefit
activities as business losses . . . limit[ing] profits generated by the organization’s
commercial activity and thereby keep[ing] corporate income tax liability to a
minimum. This strategy works for some organizations, but relatively few hybrid
social enterprises are based on a business model that permits them to forgo outside
sources of investment and support. 37

From the perspective of a for-profit businessperson, this approach could easily
work for a philanthropic subsidiary or a successful for-profit parent company—and
a route Google.org could have chosen if its social causes were less venture capital
based—with tax liability being the only major concern. From the perspective of a
nonprofit entrepreneur, however, this does not address the core issue of easier
access to capital. The unmistakable drawbacks of both approaches call out for an
entity designed for hybrid use like the CIC. Fortunately, state legislatures have
begun to identify the limitations with these two amalgamations; two CIC-like
business forms are gaining traction in state legislatures. 38
C. The WorldOne Case
The George Washington University Law School’s Small Business and
Community Economic Development Clinic provides free legal assistance to startups in the District of Columbia (D.C.) metro area. Generally, clients of the clinic
are businesses with less than $35,000 in start-up capital and that would be
otherwise unable to afford legal advice.
WorldOne sought legal advice and counseling on the choices of legal entity
availability to it and help with its organizing documents. Started by two young

34

Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 344.
36
Id. at 364–65.
37
Id.
38
See Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B Corporation Legislation Table, SUFFOLK
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL (May 26, 2011), http://www.intersectorl3c.com/goopages/pages_download
gallery/download.php?filename=14430.pdf&orig_name=50_state_series-l3c_and_bcorp_legislation.
pdf&cdpath=/files/50_state_series-l3c_and_bcorp_legislation.pdf; 2011 Annual Report, CERTIFIED B
CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/B-Media/2011-Annual-Report (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
35
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women with years of experience in international development, the company
offered worldwide volunteering opportunities through a network of local partners.
Because of their years of experience, the entrepreneurs were able to identify a gap
in the market. The founders believed that, despite their nonprofit status, other
volunteering organizations offering worldwide programs were passing an
unnecessary share of the cost onto the volunteers. This presented the opportunity
to create a more efficient competitor.
They also recognized the potential benefit of not pursuing nonprofit status.
Easier access to capital coupled with less administrative cost in maintaining the
status were important factors, considering the founders’ opinions on the potential
to generate revenue. However, the fundamental concept of the entire organization
is based on international development. Philanthropy in these communities leads to
partnerships. The partnerships allow WorldOne to offer programs to a volunteer at
a lower cost than if the volunteer had pursued the venture on their own. Providing
a social benefit is tied very closely to the business model. Consequently, a
philanthropic arm to the overarching organization is indispensible.
Although a myriad of factors always influence choice of entity for a new
business, ultimately, the founders decided to build their social enterprise under the
framework of existing D.C. LLC law. As noted earlier, complexity and cost are an
issue when creating a hybrid entity without the support of a hybrid statute. The
WorldOne founders expressed precisely these concerns. The opportunity cost of
the not-for-loss enterprise and the administrative complexity of the multiple-entity
enterprise eliminated those possibilities, and a simple LLC was finally chosen
because of the founders’ desire to move forward with the project as soon as
possible. A more financially efficient philanthropic entity would be created after
the business was up and running. However, had D.C. already adopted a type of
hybrid statute, the WorldOne founders would have been able to address more of
their choice of entity issues at the time the organizational documents were drafted.
III. L3C
The flexibility of a traditional LLC is its most important feature. The L3C is
merely an extrapolation LLC, focused on delivering social impact through its
increased ability to raise capital. For WorldOne, other streams of capital could
have accelerated growth in its formative years, avoiding much of the struggle of
maturing through a period as a micro-business with international goals.
A. The Background and Basis for the L3C Designation
The L3C concept sprang from a series of meetings at the Mary Elizabeth &
Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation in 2005. 39 Its originators were seeking, “the
integration of business and mission in a self-sufficient, profit making venture.” 40
By 2007, Robert Lang, Marcus Owens, and Arthur Wood had developed the idea

39
Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and Mission
Driven Organizations, 5 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 251, 253 (2007).
40
Id. at 253.
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enough to circulate a paper among the American Law Institute. 41
The structural concept envisioned by Lang is what truly bridges the gap
between profit and non-profit organizations. While branding a corporation “lowprofit” provides benefits regarding the visibility of a new business’s social goals,
the L3C offers a tangible benefit as well. 42 This tangible benefit was designed “to
ameliorate social entrepreneurs’ capital formation concerns by making the entities
attractive vehicles for program-related investments by foundations.” 43 This new
stream of capital is what sets the L3C apart as an important tool in the
development of hybrid organizations.
The PRI is not a typical form of capital investment. “The PRI is defined as
an investment made by a foundation or trust to support a charitable project or
activity. . . . Income and appreciation are acceptable, but not intended or required
outcomes.” 44 The lack of a requirement for proper return on investment parallels
the double-bottom line requirement of the social entrepreneur. PRIs are the
solution to the problem of capital in “profit as a secondary interest” businesses.
However, while PRIs hold great potential for social enterprises, they “have been
underutilized because their risks and transaction costs make them unappealing to
most private foundations.” 45 The originators of the L3C specifically designed it to
solve those problems.
The language of the Internal Revenue Code governing PRIs is the active
ingredient that separates the L3C from the traditional LLC. Marcus Owens’ idea
was to:
[D]raft model legislation . . . that closely tracked the language of the PRI
requirements laid out in § 4944(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. In other
words . . . any social enterprise that qualified for L3C status under state law would
ipso facto qualify for program-related investments under the IRS code. 46

The designation under state law would remove the transactional cost of an
investigation or letter ruling from the IRS. 47
The text of adopted L3C statutes is the key element in creating the
presumption of legitimacy and trustworthiness for foundations. For example, the
Vermont statute requires that the company furthers the accomplishment of a
charitable or educational purpose within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code. 48 The statute goes on to mirror other specific requirements for PRI
reception. 49 The adoption of such language paves the way for a greater ease of use
for the L3C.

41

Id. at 253.
Kelley, supra note 4, at 372.
43
Id. at 372.
44
Lang, supra note 39, at 254.
45
Kelley, supra note 4, at 372.
46
Id. at 372–73.
47
Id. at 373.
48
H. 775, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (Vt. 2008), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/acts/ACT106.HTM.
49
Id.
42
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B. An Alternate History: The L3C Applied to WorldOne
1. Advantages
The L3C could have been the perfect solution to the unique needs of
WorldOne. Organizing as an L3C would have offered the identical advantages
that it received by choosing an LLC, but with the addition of a new source for
capital. 50 The additional language required under L3C statutes, such as the
furtherance of some charitable purpose, 51 would have not effected the business
model of WorldOne because charitable donations are already an important element
in its development.
2. Shortcomings
The lack of blanket approval for the reception of PRIs by recognized L3Cs is
the biggest shortcoming regarding its use. Just because the D.C. passed a bill
permitting L3Cs, does not mean that WorldOne could avoid the expense of
receiving a letter ruling for permission to receive PRIs. Although the L3C statute
somewhat streamlines this process, WorldOne would only choose this course if it
saw PRIs as an important element in its development. 52
C. State of the L3C
1. L3Cs in the Federal System
Recognition in the federal system remains the biggest obstacle to widespread
L3C use. The IRS has not allowed foundations to direct PRIs to L3Cs without an
extensive investigation or letter ruling expressly permitting it. Until the IRS grants
the approval envisioned by the business form’s founders or Congress passes a law
mandating the same, and thereby easing the transactional cost to potential
foundation investors, the L3C will be missing an important component of its
complete adoption.
2. L3Cs in the States
The struggle for acceptance of the L3C in state legislatures is ongoing. The
number of states recognizing this hybrid form is growing, and consideration of the
L3C entity arises often in many state assemblies. 53 However, the opinions of the
legislators are not unanimously pro-L3C; the form’s limitations have called into

50

See Kelley, supra note 4, at 372.
See H. 775, supra note 48.
52
For example, a large charity that supported international volunteering opportunities and that was
structured to take advantage of PRIs could be a significant source of capital for WorldOne. If this
opportunity for tax-advantaged capital contribution exceeded the cost of a letter ruling, or if the IRS
were to grant the blanket authorization, the L3C would allow the young business to flourish during the
normally difficult early stages of development.
53
See Here’s the Latest, supra note 11.
51
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question the necessity of its adoption. 54
The time and debate intensive nature of the democratic process makes the
approval of new laws a difficult task. However, since its proposal in late 2007,
seven state legislatures have created a new statute authorizing the use of the L3C. 55
These efforts have not been in vain: 153 L3Cs have been created in Vermont, 81 in
Michigan, 57 in Illinois, 32 in Utah, 22 in Wyoming, 18 in North Carolina, and 8
in Louisiana. 56 It is also in consideration in fourteen other states as well:
Arkansas, Arizona, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon and Rhode Island. 57 This leaves the L3C just shy of the
tipping point of adoption or consideration in a majority of states.
Adoption in the consideration states is not guaranteed, however, because the
L3C has not met with unanimous approval. “The lack of a major initiative to
change the laws relating to the duties of the directors of for-profit corporations in
order to foster the intentional pursuit of below-market returns on behalf of forprofit corporation shareholders tends to support the premise that such investors
may be few.” 58 Furthermore, “[m]any regulators are simply unwilling to sign off
on the premise that the elimination of private letter rulings is a compelling
regulatory goal.” 59 These problems stem from the transactional cost of achieving
letter rulings from the IRS for permission to grant PRIs to L3Cs because the IRS
does not distinguish between an L3C and a traditional LLC. 60
Several states have determined that the potential benefits of the L3C statute
outweigh the questions of its usefulness. It has been stated that, “the L3C
community concedes that a change in state law . . . standing alone does not create
new opportunity” because the IRS has yet to grant blanket approval of PRIs to
L3Cs. 61 However, watershed acceptance from the majority of state legislatures
would demonstrate a consensus among the states and put pressure on the IRS to
grant blanket approval, eliminating the transactional cost of the letter ruling.
IV. B CORPORATION
While the ultimate goal of a hybrid organization is to bridge a gap in legal
framework, these organizations generally find their basis on one side of the gap.
Just as the L3C is best understood as an extrapolation of the LLC, the B
Corporation is best understood as an extrapolation of the C Corporation. That
extrapolation would have offered tangible benefits to WorldOne, but again like the
L3C, its progression through state legislatures is still in its infancy.

54
David Edward Spenard, Panacea or Problem: A State Regulator’s Perspective on the L3C
Model, 65 TAX EXEMPT ORG. REV. 36, 39, 40 (2010).
55
See Here’s the Latest, supra note 11.
56
See id.
57
Bishop, supra note 38.
58
Spenard, supra note 54, at 38.
59
Id. at 40.
60
See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 619, 646–47 (2010).
61
Id. at 38.
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A. The Background and Basis for the B Corporation
The B Corporation concept is a product of the early 2000s. 62 The B
Corporation idea was conceived by Jay Coen Gilbert and Bart Houlihan, former
Co-Founder and President, respectively, of the “AND 1” basketball footwear
company. 63 The purest description of their vision is the double-bottom line: the
expansion of corporate responsibilities beyond profit-maximization to include
social interest. 64 However, marketing of the B Corporation brand is also a crucial
element: the idea’s founders created B Lab in order to certify certain corporations
as truly socially beneficial. 65
The implementation of a double-bottom line is the most legally
distinguishable feature of operating a B Corporation. Articles of Incorporation
must define the best interests of the company to include social consideration—
which may be employee, community, or environmentally based—in addition to
profit consideration. 66 Such a structure immunizes for-profit-based social
entrepreneurs from liability to shareholders for decisions that may sacrifice profit
for social benefit. 67 The element of social benefit may allow nonprofit-based
social entrepreneurs to seek capital in the form of PRIs, although this theory has
yet to be tested in court. 68
The B Corporation is not exclusive to new businesses. If financially feasible,
existing corporations may amend their articles of incorporation to adopt the B
Corporation framework. 69 To become a true B Corporation, however, more is
required than the creation or adjustment of organizing documents. 70
Public consciousness of a corporation’s social benefit is important to the
growth of social enterprise. Beyond a double-bottom line legal structure, a
company must submit to a set of standards regarding their tangible social impact to
qualify officially as a B Corporation. 71 To protect this vision, the idea’s founders
opened B Lab. 72 B Lab is an independent nonprofit organization that, “functions
as an impartial third-party that certifies and rates B corporations on how well they
actually meet the[] standards.” 73 There are considerable parallels between B Lab’s
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protective or promotional role for the B Corporation brand of social enterprise and
the United Kingdom government’s regulation of the CIC. B Lab acts as a monitor
to ensure tangible social impact in the same fashion as the CIC Regulator. 74 B
Lab’s “Impact Rating System” requires a B Corporation to demonstrate sustained
commitment to the social element of the bottom line through recertification, which
is required every two years. 75 Beyond protecting the B Corporation’s integrity,
these safeguards also promote trust in the integrity of social entrepreneurship.
Also important to the B Corporation idea is the concept of branding as it
relates to the promotion of social enterprise:
[T]he primary benefit of the B designation will be to create a brand for corporations
that are truly and fundamentally committed to socially beneficial outcomes.
Through this brand, and the rigorous standards that organizations must meet to earn
it, socially conscious consumers and investors will have confidence that a
corporation’s expressed commitment to nonfinancial bottom lines is more than
mere marketing. 76

The social responsibility of each of the 370 certified B Corporations is even loudly
trumpeted on B Lab’s website. 77 While it is clearly a more private or free-market
approach, again the branding goal is essentially the same as the CIC’s
supplemental programs: to increase public knowledge and confidence in social
enterprise.
Beyond marketing and press relations, B Lab promotes legislative adoption
of the B Corporation as an alternative choice of entity. 78 This lobbying is
important not only to the wide spread acceptance and recognition of the B
Corporation, but also to an argument that the B Corporation is more than just a seal
of approval by an independent organization. The model legislation, which forms
the basis for its proposed entity in each legislature, offers legal protection to the
directors of an organization in the pursuit of a double bottom line. 79 The cost of
this new right, however, is increased oversight on the corporation to make sure a
tangible social benefit exists. 80
B. An Alternate History: The B Corporation Applied to WorldOne
If D.C. had adopted a B Corporation statute, the founders of WorldOne
would have had an attractive alternative to the LLC entity they ultimately chose. B
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Lab is willing to certify other corporate forms, such as an LLC. In that sense the
founders could have maintained their original choice of entity, but would still
receive their own benefit. The basic idea behind the B Corporation, granting the
directors of a for-profit business the right to a double-bottom line, would have
allowed WorldOne to conduct the philanthropic elements of its venture without
issue. 81 However, this choice would not have been made without drawbacks. The
B Corporation designation does little outside of the double-bottom line flexibility
and the notoriety as a social-benefit driven business, and that designation is not
free.
1 . Advantages
The fundamental idea behind the B Corporation solves the primary issue
facing WorldOne: how to create both profit and social impact without the expense
and complexity of administering multiple organizations. The B Corporation would
allow WorldOne to fund its relationships with overseas partners without concern
for the effect on total profits or the legal rights of investors to maximize profits.
Further, because the B Corporation regulations permit the WorldOne founders to
maintain the flexible LLC underneath the B Corporation label, all underlying
corporate entity issues would be addressed.
Beyond the structural benefits, the “seal of approval” that goes along with
the B Corporation status is a benefit that cannot be ignored. B Lab offers an
independent assessment of the tangible social impact of a corporation.
Specifically, as the recognition of the B Corporation increases through national
exposure of the entity—and through B Lab’s own trumpeting 82—WorldOne would
receive free advertising in a positive spotlight. For a fledgling business, cost-free
publicity is invaluable.
2. Shortcomings
The most obvious shortcoming of pursuing B Corporation certification for
WorldOne during their start-up would be the cost. B Corporation requires a
licensing fee in order to be certified. 83 While the fee is generally very small in
proportion to profit—only $500 for a corporation with less than $2 Million in
annual sales 84—any outlay for a business with start-up capital of less than $35,000
is an important consideration. Administrative costs for B Lab certification exist as
well, as continued monitoring of tangible social benefit is a requisite. This may
have been difficult to prove during WorldOne’s formative years.
Beyond direct cost, it is unclear if the positive attention received by B
Corporation status and protection for the board overcomes the opportunity cost of
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alternative ways to spend the money. If the cost of licensing, administrating, and
maintaining WorldOne’s B Corporation status were used early in its development
to instead receive a letter ruling from the IRS permitting the reception of PRIs, the
budding hybrid corporation would have an entirely new avenue of capital. If the
founders are forced to choose how to best grow their business—which they believe
provides a social benefit regardless of entity—the sacrifice of a “seal of approval”
and free advertising must be weighed against the potential for capitalization.
WorldOne’s aggressive international plans required capitalization from many
sources, and PRIs could have significantly accelerated their growth.
C. State of the B Corporation
A review of the current standing of the B Corporation reinforces the idea of a
competition between the two newest business forms. Of all corporations that have
considered the new hybrid business entities, Vermont is the only state to enact
legislation for both corporate forms 85 Furthermore, in direct comparison to the
L3C, the B Corporation appears to be at a disadvantage in terms of legislative
acceptance. 86 However, this perspective does not account for the B Corporation’s
unique situation.
Currently, B Corporation legislation has passed in Maryland, Vermont, and
New Jersey. 87 Additionally, B Corporation bills are currently in consideration in
Colorado, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, California,
and Michigan. 88 In contrast, the L3C has been passed by nine legislatures and is in
consideration by fourteen more. 89
However, focusing purely on B Corporation sponsored legislation does not
tell the whole story. B Corporation sponsored legislation is not required to create a
pure B Corporation-type form. Thirty-one states have passed a precursor rule
known as a “constituency statute.” 90 A state constituency statute allows the
addition of outside interests to articles of incorporation. 91 While the B Corporation
statute seeks to grant rights to the beneficiaries against the corporation, a
constituency statute does not clearly address those rights. 92 Furthermore, the
constituency statutes and B Corporation statutes remain untested in court. 93
V. CONCLUSION
Scientists have routinely demonstrated that monetary reward is the best
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motivator for mechanical or heuristic work. 94 However, scientists have also
routinely demonstrated that when a task requires even rudimentary cognitive skill,
higher monetary incentives lead to poorer performance. 95 This seemingly
counterintuitive result raises a surprisingly simple question: what really motivates
workers? 96 Alongside self-determination and mastery, purpose was found to be
one of the primary factors that leads to better performance and personal
satisfaction. Simply put, workers tend to be more motivated by a purpose they
believe in, such as a social benefit, than pure profit for either themselves or their
employer.
As entrepreneurs begin to recognize the value of employees that are
motivated by the social purpose of their job, more so than by the pure
competitiveness of their salary against the private sector, those entrepreneurs will
turn to business structures that allow them to operate for both a profit and a social
goal. The evolution of entrepreneurial needs requires the promotion of hybrid
business entities. The simplicity and visibility of the L3C and B Corporations
provide an easy solution to that requirement.
In a sense, the L3C and B Corporations are not competing, because it is
possible for a properly organized business to be both. However, some semblance
of recognition by state governments is important to the expanded use of each
entity, and it is doubtful that the majority of state legislatures will spend the time
approving two statutes that aim to accomplish the same goal. Discussions
suggesting that either hybrid model may be prevailing as the accepted social
entrepreneurship entity belie the fact that a majority of the states have not accepted
either hybrid model. Furthermore, both hybrid types stand just short of the critical
mass necessary for a majority of state legislatures to take notice. Only time will
tell whether the B Corporation’s strong branding approach or the L3C’s flexibility
and structural potential can ride the crest towards mainstream acceptance.
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